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Central banks: Climate governors of last resort? 
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and  





The global and regional leadership of central banks in response to the COVID-19 pandemic 
has heightened public and political debates over their role in the governance of an arguably 
more fundamental planetary crisis: the climate crisis. Strategically harnessing the resources and 
reach of central banks would seem crucial to achieving a genuine step-change in the 
governance of the climate crisis. We consider how critical social scientists might contribute to 
debates over the potential of central banks to act as ‘climate governors of last resort’. 
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Central banks: Climate governors of last resort? 
 
Introduction: Last resort governance 
 
More than at any time since the establishment of the Swedish Riksbank in 1668, it would now 
seem appropriate to speak of ‘central-bank-led capitalism’ (Bowman et al., 2013). In response 
to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Federal Reserve (Fed), Bank of England (BoE), European 
Central Bank (ECB), People’s Bank of China (PBC) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) have, in 
particular, further exercised and entrenched their positions of global and regional leadership in 
economic governance (Jackson, 2020; Tooze 2020a). Since the economic ramifications of the 
pandemic first became apparent in early March 2020, the Fed and other major central banks 
have made  an extensive and expensive array of complex crisis management interventions.  
Central bank leadership is rooted in their institutional monopoly over the issue and 
management of sovereign territorial money (i.e. ‘currency’). In David Harvey’s (1982: 247) 
terms,  this places central banks at the ‘commanding heights’ of ‘the hierarchy of monetary 
institutions’ in domestic economies, as they seek to ‘guarantee the creditworthiness and quality 
of private bank moneys’. Central banks have been further empowered in the post-Bretton 
Woods era of fiat money, as their issuance of sovereign currencies is untethered from gold 
reserves. In pursuit of monetary stability mandates and low-inflation targets, central banks also 
typically enjoy independence by statute from government in liberal democratic states. 
Moreover, the global and regional leadership of central banks rests on a further hierarchy, the 
international hierarchy of monetary power. This presently gives the Fed, in particular, the kind 
of extra-territorial reach necessary to guarantee private banking and financial markets that are 
largely denominated in US dollars, and increasingly operate at a transnational scale.  
Nonetheless, many of the key crisis management techniques adopted by the principal 
central banks in recent months were only minted a decade or so ago. Honed during the global 
financial crisis of 2008 by the Fed and BoE in particular (Langley, 2015), asset purchase and 
quantitative easing (QE) techniques, resourced by monopoly over fiat money issuance have 
become crucial to central bank capacities to fulfil their broadened financial stability mandates. 
This is because these techniques enable central banks to take up the position of ‘investor of last 
resort’ during crises, purchasing and guaranteeing bonds and other assets in capital markets in 
order to keep borrowing costs down and prevent precipitous devaluations and investor 
insolvencies. Current crisis management by the major central banks thus extends well beyond 
their historical role as  the ‘lender of last resort’ (LOLR), a role that was first specified and 
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legitimated for the BoE by Walter Bagehot in the latter half of the nineteenth-century 
(Mehrling, 2011). Through to the crisis of 2008, the scope and scale of crisis management by 
central banks was shaped largely by the ‘Bagehot dictum’: lend feely and promptly, at a penalty 
rate and against good collateral, to solvent but illiquid banks. In contrast, and for the second 
time in the twenty-first century, today’s leading central banks are enacting wide-ranging crisis 
management programmes of last resort investing, alongside monetary policy decisions and 
emergency liquidity lending to banks. At the time of writing, in July 2020, they have already 
pledged resources on a scale that far surpasses those committed during the global financial 
crisis.   
Our Commentaries contribution responds to the public and political debate over central 
bank leadership in the governance of an arguably more fundamental planetary crisis: the 
climate crisis. This debate has gained new urgency amidst the management of the COVID-19 
crisis, not least because so much of the global capitalist economy has moved onto the balance 
sheets of the major central banks during the last few months. The unrivalled monetary resources 
and seemingly ever-expanding last resort governmental responsibilities of central banks have 
been in evidence during the COVID-19 crisis, and this is provoking reappraisals of their 
capacities for global climate change governance.  
Private banks and institutions have certainly developed the specialist products and 
services of the ‘green’ or ‘carbon finance’ sector in recent years. But a huge ‘investment gap’ 
persists between current realities and the estimated volume of new capital required in each and 
every year to finance a low-carbon transition of economy and society. At the same time, ‘Green 
Keynesianism’ and a ‘Green New Deal’ stand as a potential alternative to the prevailing private 
finance- and NGO-led approach to climate change governance. But the scale of fiscal funding 
required for a Green New Deal approach is likely to become even more problematic going 
forward, given the shrinking tax revenues and stimulus packages promulgated by the COVID-
19 pandemic. Regardless of the approach to be taken-up in the future, strategically harnessing 
the resources and reach of the major central banks would seem to be crucial to the governance 
of the climate crisis. Prevailing and progressive political agendas have variously converged on 
the possibility that central banks could act as what we call the ‘climate governors of last resort’.    
How, then, might critical social scientists  intervene in the debate over the potential 
leadership of central banks in climate change governance?  Given fresh impetus by last resort 
governance during the COVID-19 pandemic, many proposals for last resort climate governance 
are presently circulating in academic, public and policy debates that seek to graft climate-
related concerns onto the financial stability mandates and techniques of central banks. While 
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these proposals should be broadly welcomed, we will call for research and political engagement 
that, first, foregrounds the centrality of the technocratic and exceptional power of central banks 
in the reproduction of contemporary capitalism, and, second, attends to the neoliberal 
governmental rationality and market-based risk management techniques that central banks are 
already adopting in relation to climate change. For us, critical social scientists should highlight 
the limitations and delimiting consequences of the emergent governmental programmes of 
central banks, informed by an oppositional politics that recognises how a genuinely progressive 
step-change in climate governance will likely require the democratic transformation and 
fundamental repurposing of central banking itself.   
 
Capitalist central banking 
 
Drawing on existing accounts of the centrality of central banks to capitalism (e.g. 
Harvey, 1982; Hall, 2008; Goodhart et al., 2014; Mann, 2010 Epstein, 2019), there would seem 
to be solid reasons to adopt a profoundly sceptical analytical and political position in the current 
debate over central bank leadership in climate change governance. When push comes to shove, 
arguably central banks will prioritise the stability and growth of capitalism in its present form. 
The current last resort investing programmes of the major central banks would seem a case in 
point, as they have been largely indiscriminate when providing life support to the assets of 
‘dirty’ and ‘clean’ economic sectors alike. Placing faith in central banks to provide last resort 
leadership in the climate crisis is perhaps to misunderstand the challenge to be confronted as a 
problem of the governance of capitalism, rather than one of the reproduction of capitalism. As 
capitalism variously seeks to redirect investment to provide a ‘socio-ecological fix’ for its 
reproduction (Ekers and Prudham, 2015), central banks will perhaps only ever be a handmaiden 
to the strategies and practices of private finance capital. The contemporary crisis-laden period 
is one of central bank-led capitalism, then, but central banking essentially remains capital-led.    
To take terms from Geoff Mann (2010: 618), moreover, the sovereignty of central banks 
has ‘a distinctively Hobbesian quality’, wherein the ‘Technocratic, class-privileged, 
autonomous governance of central material and ideological aspects of collective and individual 
life … is difficult to reconcile with any acceptable definition of democracy’. It is largely down 
to the central banks themselves to decide if they accept the juridical and statutory remit of their 
sovereign power, or instead to choose to step up to the plate as the climate governors of last 
resort. Exceptions to their legal remits  can be declared by central banks themselves, as has 
happened in recent crises with their moves beyond last resort lending and into last resort 
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investing. Yet, these legal boundaries can also provide a bulwark for central bankers who are 
wary of ‘mission creep’, and who wish to remain ‘above politics’ and beyond public debates 
and democratic pressures (Economist, 2019). Juridical provisions are therefore significant in 
shaping the role of central banks in the ‘Climate Leviathan’ (Wainwright and Mann, 2018), the 
emergent mode of global governance that is incorporating climate change into the existing 
institutional machinery for managing global capitalism. Most notably, for some staff at the only 
truly globally powerful central bank, such as San Francisco Fed Executive Vice President, 
Glenn Rudebusch (2019), ‘environmental sustainability’ and ‘climate change are not directly 
included in the Fed’s statutory mandate of price stability and full employment’.  
It is certainly tempting at the outset, therefore, to dismiss current political debates about 
central bank leadership in climate change governance, and to simply assert that these 
institutions are structurally ill-suited to anything more than ‘adaptation projects’ that stabilize 
capitalism (Wainwright and Mann, 2018). However, much of the present interest in the 
progressive possibilities for central bank leadership has followed on the back of nascent actions 
already underway at major central banks. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the BoE, Bank of 
France and ECB in particular demonstrated a willingness to play a leading role in climate 
change governance (Carney, 2016; Carney et al., 2019), spurred on by international 
collaboration and international organizations (Adrian, Morsink and Schumacher, 2020; 
Network for Greening the Financial System, 2019). Indeed, as the economic ramifications of 
the pandemic have unfolded and calls to ‘build back better’ have grown louder, commitments 
to this agenda have been publicly reaffirmed by some (Bailey et al., 2020; Khalaf and Arnold, 
2020), supported through the publication of best practice technical advice aimed at all central 
banks (Network for Greening the Financial System, 2020a, 2020b). For social scientists, 
engaging critically in debates over central bank leadership in climate change governance 
increasingly requires attention is given not only to whether or not capitalist central banks can 
act as climate governors of last resort, but also to how they are already attempting to doing so. 
 
Financial stability, climate change risk and stress testing  
 
For central banks, it is the financial stability implications of climate change that to date 
have prompted their governmental interventions and proposals, and not the climate crisis itself. 
To borrow terms from the UK government’s strategy for the financial sector response to 
climate change (HM Government 2019), central banks are relatively inactive at present in 
relation to ‘financing green’ (i.e. supporting and shaping flows of private investment in support 
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of a low-carbon transition). Instead, they concentrate on ‘greening finance’ (i.e. encouraging 
the transformation of financial market-based risk management to embrace so-called ‘climate 
change risks’). Climate change risks encompass two types of risk that impact the valuation of 
financial assets: ‘physical risks’ that have a direct impact and arise from the increased incidence 
of storms, floods, droughts and so on; and, ‘transition risks’ that materialise from changes in 
climate change policies and green technologies feeding through into the wider economy (e.g. 
IMF, 2020). What worries central bankers is that there has been very limited progress on the 
calculation of climate change risk across global financial market institutions (see Christophers, 
2019). A pre-requisite for such calculation is transparency and the availability of sufficiently 
detailed information. But the widely lauded voluntary global standards for corporations – i.e. 
the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) - 
will not be fully implemented for at least another two-three years.  
The ‘quintessentially neoliberal modality of governance’ (Christophers, 2017) shared 
by central banks holds that improved assessment of climate change risks is necessary for the 
smooth and stable transition of financial systems towards a low-carbon future. There is 
certainly some disagreement between central banks at present over whether their leadership is 
required to ensure that this transition takes place. The Fed, for example, is clear that it expects 
climate change risk to be included in the risk management practices of the private banks that 
is supervises, but has not yet issued specific regulatory guidance to this effect (Brainard, 2019). 
Meanwhile, for Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann, improving the calculation of climate 
change risk is primarily a problem for credit rating agencies, who need to invest in widening 
the scope of their analytical tool kits (Bloomberg, 2019). Regardless of these differences, the 
approach that all central banks are presently taking to climate change is constituted in the first 
instance through a body of expert neoliberal economic knowledge on financial stability and 
market-based risk management that has developed and changed over the last three decades or 
so (Morris, 2018), and not through climate science. 
For the more activist central banks such as the BoE and ECB, their self-proclaimed 
leadership in climate change governance is a matter of incorporating climate change risk within 
macro-prudential stress testing (MPST) regimes (see Coombs, 2020; Morris 2018; Langley, 
2013). The governmental technique of MPST dates from the global financial crisis, and is 
included in subsequent revisions to international standards for financial regulation and 
supervision. It is anticipatory in nature, and its global adoption by central banks, regulators and 
supervisors reflects a loss of confidence in firm-level, micro-prudential probabilistic 
techniques of risk management (most notably, value-at-risk, VaR). During a MPST exercise, 
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central banks and other authorities with financial stability mandates work with the principal 
private banks across a financial system in order to model their potential capacity to manage 
projected losses. Banks and financial market institutions participate in stress testing regimes in 
order to qualify for lender of last resort facilities and to conform to regulatory and supervisory 
regimes. Typically, central banks will devise scenarios of adverse and extreme events or 
conditions, each a combination of narrative and quantitative imaginaries of a macroeconomic 
future that will negatively impact the value of assets (e.g. loans, mortgages, bonds, equities, 
etc.). Projected losses are modelled according to these scenarios, and institutions found to lack 
resilience and to endanger aggregate financial stability are required to increase their capital 
reserves. 
MPST has rapidly become an established central bank financial stability governance 
technique for pre-empting high-impact low-probability economic ‘tail risks’, or ‘black swans’. 
The incorporation of climate change risk into MPST suggests that high-impact low-probability 
‘green swans’ are now also preoccupying certain central banks (BIS, 2020). Prior to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the BoE (2019), for example, was preparing to conduct a (now delayed) 
experimental MPST exercise with UK banks and insurers that was due to run through to 2021. 
Similar to exercises undertaken by the Dutch central bank in 2018 and currently underway in 
France, the BoE’s MPST will seek to test the exposure of loan books and portfolios to the 
transition risks of climate change that could undermine current asset valuations. Since 2016, 
the BoE’s MPST regime has employed two distinct testing exercises - the Annual Cyclical 
Scenario (ACS) based on its assessment of current risks to financial stability; and, the Biennial 
Exploratory Scenario (BES) that figures stability threats that do not have empirical historical 
precedent. Both aim to assess capital adequacy, and the 2021 exercise falls under the BES 
category. It will comprise three different thirty-year exploratory scenarios, each oriented 
towards assisting with ‘sizing risks’. Each scenario will imagine a political-economic future of 
‘earlier’, ‘later’ or ‘no’ UK policy change and economic restructuring in relation to Paris 
Agreement temperature and emissions targets, and their attendant climate-related and macro-
economic variables. The more delayed the policy and economic response to climate change, 
the greater the magnitude of risks and the hypothetical shock to the financial system. Rather 
than assess the capital adequacy of banks and (re)insurers, however, the BoE will examine how 
they expect to adjust their business models in the context of these scenarios and their attendant 
risks, and hopes to ascertain the aggregate effect of these responses on the financial system and 
wider economy. The inclusion of the insurance industry in the BoE exercise is novel and 
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significant here, as banks often assume that they can rely on insurers to cover climate-related 




 MPST and associated rationalities of market-based risk management and institutional 
and system resilience presently provide, then, the touchstone for central banks that are 
beginning to enact climate change governance by widening their financial stability mandates. 
Attuning critical social scientists to this neoliberal governmental agenda and its accompanying 
techniques is important in two main respects. First, whilst proponents of MPST by central 
banks emphasize how it has a system-wide focus that creates the kind of transformative 
potential necessary to catalyse the private financing of a low-carbon transition, social scientists 
can identify and underline the inherent socio-technical limitations to what MPST can achieve. 
For example, shaped by the experience of the global financial crisis, the principal focus for 
MPST is banking resilience. Ironically, this may actually serve to place climate change risk 
beyond the governmental reach of central banks in a contemporary financial landscape that is 
marked by the wholesale financial circuits of ‘shadow banks’ (i.e. non-depository institutions, 
such as asset managers, pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, private equity funds, etc.). 
Indeed, there is currently a strong tendency for regulated banking and insurance sectors to use 
shadow banking as a ‘spatial fix’ for climate tail risks - such as catastrophes - that cannot or 
will not be bought, allocated or diversified in the regulated system (Taylor, 2020). Likewise, 
shadow banking circulations rest on the collateral needed to underpin trust and sustain short-
term borrowing and market liquidity, but there are as yet no market conventions or regulatory 
provisions to incorporate climate change risk into assessments of the quality of underlying 
collateral (Gabor, 2020). 
 Second, critical social scientists can also highlight how the neoliberal foray of central 
banks into the governance of climate change is already having delimiting and de-politicising 
consequences for climate change governance. Considerable academic and activist energy is 
currently being expended to cajole central banks to tinker with MPST techniques, and to 
somewhat broaden their neoliberal technocratic agendas of financial stability and climate 
change risk. There is, for example, significant pressure on the ECB to consider the carbon 
credentials of the corporate assets that they purchase and support as investor of last resort 
(Khalaf and Arnold, 2020). At the same time, however, more radical and progressive proposals 
advocating for a very different role for central banks in climate change governance are 
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becoming increasingly side-lined and jettisoned from public debates. For example, central 
banks could more directly regulate the lending of private banks towards low-carbon sectors by, 
for instance, differentiating their reserve requirements according to the destination of lending 
(Campiglio, 2015). Alternatively, they could position themselves at the heart of a Green New 
Deal, enacting so-called ‘green QE’ and using sovereign asset purchase programmes to finance 
new investment for a low-carbon transition (Economist, 2019). Yet, there is little indication 
that central banks are willing to take up these more radical visions of their leadership in climate 
change governance.   
 This takes us back, then, to the centrality of central banks to the reproduction of 
contemporary capitalism and the Hobbesian character of their sovereign power. In Trevor 
Jackson’s (2020) terms, it may well be that the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that ‘control 
of central banks’ has to be ‘at the center of any transformative political strategy’. But, how is 
such control to be rested? During a recent webinar at the LSE Grantham Research Institute on 
Climate Change and the Environment, Adam Tooze (2020b) cited the anti-inflationary 
‘Volcker shock’ instituted by the Fed in the late 1970s as evidence of the possibility of sudden 
paradigm shifts in central banking. This, he remarked, instantiated a ‘manifest social-political 
conflict in which central bankers adopted positions antagonistic to the interests 
of constitutive groups in society’. In effect, Volcker prioritized the interests of capital over 
labour (Epstein, 2019), and what is needed now is central bank action premised on reigning in 
the interests of contemporary capital in the name of people and planet. Tooze also drew 
parallels between the then Fed Chairman, Paul Volcker, and the current ECB President, 
Christine Lagarde: because Lagarde has also come to central banking from a career in politics 
rather than finance, she is apparently more able to lead a ‘green shock’ in central banking. But 
critical social scientists should be wary of placing too much faith in the ability of ostensibly 
enlightened technocrats to seize control of the machinery of central banking. Redirecting 
central banks’ resources and reach towards a genuinely transformative governmental agenda 
that acts on climate change (rather than its financial stability implications) will most likely 
necessitate the democratic transformation and fundamental repurposing of central banking 
itself (see Mann, 2010). For critical social scientists researching and engaging with debates 
over the potential leadership of central banks in climate change governance, it is essential that 
their interventions are animated by normative, politically prior and oppositional questions 
about what central banks could and should do. The climate governors of last resort are already 
taking up their positions, and how they are seeking to adapt and exercise their leadership is fast 
becoming part of the climate crisis problem. 
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